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power to adopt reasonable rules to assist the accomplishment of
its functions, and, second, as a matter of statutory construction
(particularly in the light of the considerations supporting the
first ground) the proviso in the 1948 act, while stating that it
should not be construed to require written contracts, did not in
terms-'or by necessary implication "prohibit School Boards from
requiring written contracts with permanent teachers." The
result reached by the court is unquestionably a proper one, according with what was undoubtedly the legislative purpose leading to the enactment of Act 353 of 1948, namely, to excuse noncompliance with the written contract requirement of the prior
law where school boards regarded such action to be unnecessary
and not otherwise. "It was never contemplated that the tenure
law would be employed for the purpose of defeating the functions
of a School Board or as a means of ignoring or refusing to obey
rules of the board adopted in aid of its administrative authority."'16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
In the course of the term the court had occasion to apply established principles of constitutional law to the facts of particular cases (discussed below) but by far the most important decision of interest to students of the subject was Orleans Parish
School Board v. Louisiana State Board of Education.' Truly a
product of "the jurist's art ' 2 the opinion in that case is almost
certain to be condemned by some as judicial acquiescence in legislative disregard of constitutional limitations. Indeed, it was
condemned as such by Judge McCaleb in his dissenting opinion.
But to others, aware of the importance of the role played by
political, social and economic considerations in constitutional
interpretation, the decision will simply reflect the action of the
court, as one organ of government, responding to the needs of a
developing social and economic order.
The constitutional provision in question was Article XII, Section 14, relating to state school funds. That section in its present
form, after enumerating the various sources from which it shall
be constituted, states "that the Legislature must and shall provide, by appropriate tax levies, appropriation or otherwise, a
16. 41 So. (2d) 461, 464.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 41 So.(2d) 509 (La. 1949).
2. Hamilton, The Jurist's Art (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1073.
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minimum amount in this State Public School Fund of not less
than Ten Million Dollars . . . [to be] .... kept in separate bank
accounts.., and all such funds, including any appropriation from
the general fund, shall be apportioned and distributed to the parishes and paid out to the parish school boards on the following
basis: [3/4 on a per-educable child basis and 1/4 on an equalization
basis.]"
In 1948 the legislature enacted a minimum teachers' salary
act,3 and in the course of making appropriations, 4 allotted a sum
in excess of $37,000,000 for each of the school years 1948-1949 and
1949-1950 to be allocated in accordance with the 3/4-/4 formula,5
together with the further sums of $8,000,000 for 1948-1949 and
$11,300,000 for 1949-1950 "to be withdrawn from the treasury and
distributed by the Louisiana State Board of Education to the
various parish and city school boards to carry into effect" the
minimum salary act's provisions.6 Finally, by a third act7 the
legislature proposed that Article XII, Section 14, be amended to
provide, inter alia, that "Anything contained in this section or
any other provision of this constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature may appropriate sufficient moneys out
of the State Public School Fund to pay ... the amounts necessary
to provide for the payment of minimum salaries as may be fixed
by the Legislature, to teachers ....
" The proposed amendment
was defeated in the November, 1948, elections.
As the state school board was preparing to allocate and distribute the $8,000,000 item in accordance with the; provisions of
the minimum salary act (which differed from the 3/4-4 formula
prescribed by Article XII, Section 14) the Orleans Parish School
Board brought injunction proceedings to restrain such action,
alleging that under the state board's plan Orleans Parish would
receive less than $200,000 whereas, under the constitutional
formula, which it alleged to be applicable, it was entitled to
approximately $1,000,000.
A majority of the court," acknowledging that the language
of Article XII, Section 14, "furnishes the impression that an ap3. La. Act 155 of 1948.
4. La. Act 350 of 1948.

5. Id. at Schedule 110, Items 6 and 7.
6. Id. at Schedule 110, Item 8. This item was originally appropriated by

the terms of Section 5 of Act 155 (the minimum salary law) but was itemvetoed by the governor with the explanation that it was duplicated in the
General Appropriation Act.
7. La. Act 512 of 1948.

8. Chief Justice O'Niell did not participate and Judge McCaleb filed a dissenting opinion.
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propriation from the State Public School Fund can legally be
made only if and when the money is apportioned and distributed
to the parishes and paid out to the parish school boards in accordance with the prescribed formula," nevertheless denied the
injunction, concluding that the formula was applicable only to
the $10,000,000 minimal amount designated in the controversial
provision.
The case is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
a court, in the process of constitutional interpretation, exercises
a considerable degree of freedom in the selection of the appropriate principle or doctrine to support the decision it deems best fitted for the occasion. In the instant case the court might have utilized the two principal arguments stressed by the dissenting
judge to invalidate the statute: (1) that resort to extraneous material may be made only to resolve, not to create, ambiguity, and,
in this case the literal clarity of constitutional provision declaring
that "all such funds, including any appropriation from the general
fund [shall be distributed in accordance with the formula],"
compelled the conclusion that the act was invalid, and (2) that
the rejection by the voters of the proposed amendment expressly
authorizing a departure from the formula constituted a clear
reflection of their will to oppose such a method of distribution.
Instead, however, the majority chose two other equally respectable doctrines to reach an opposite result which it deemed more
suitable in the circumstances: (1) that statutes enacted by the
legislature are presumed to be valid, and (2) where a constitutional provision is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which
will sustain a legislative enactment and the other will not, the
former is to be preferred.
The apparent ease with which the majority rejected the interpretative rules invoked by the dissent and adopted another
set of determinative principles effectively demonstrates that constitutional interpretation is not a mechanical process to be achieved by the mere invocation of rules or doctrines. The principles
themselves are but means to ends-ends which the court in the
process of decision has concluded are to be achieved in preference
to others. And in the making of this preference of ends the court
is influenced to a large degree by political, social and economic
considerations-an influence which may or may not find expression in the court's opinion.
In the instant case we do find the court giving expression
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in its opinion to the consideration of these factors where, in discussing the effect of a contrary decision, it is said:
"If such be the correct interpretation of those provisions
the appropriation by the 1948 Legislature from the State Public School Fund to carry into effect the minimum Teachers
Salary Schedule provided in Act No. 155 of 1948 (unless apportioned and distributed on the 3/4th-1/4th basis) is, of course,
unconstitutional and illegal. Likewise stridken with nullity
are those other appropriations of 1948, as well as many made
during preceding years, for such items as teachers' retirement, education for crippled children, vocational rehabilitation, and salary and expenses of State Superintendent of Education, because the appropriation for each of those has been
from the State Public School Fund without apportionment
and distribution to the parish school boards on a per educable
and equalization basis." 9
Having thus obviously made a policy judgment in the case,
the majority opinion then proceeds to marshal support for its
conclusion in the manner previously indicated.
The critical
language of the constitutional provision in question is first found
to be ambiguous when viewed in the light of its historical setting
and frequent amendment. It is observed that the provision when
originally adopted in 1921 called for distribution entirely on a
per educable basis but imposed no duty on the legislature to augment the fund by additional appropriation. By amendment in
1930 it became incumbent upon the legislature, if necessary, to
supplement the school fund by appropriation in an amount sufficient to provide a minimum of twelve dollars per educable child,
two dollars of which was to be apportioned on an equalization basis.
The legislature was authorized although not required to make
additional appropriations and no provision was made concerning
the manner in which such additional appropriations, if made,
were to be allocated. In 1934, by further amendment, it was provided that the legislature must provide a minimum of $10,000,000
for the fund and at the same time the controversial 3/-1/4 formula
was inserted with the proviso that until the fund amounted to
$10,000,000 the 3- / formula should be replaced by a 5/6-1/6
formula and a further proviso "that in no case shall the state support for any parish exceed ninety (90%) per centum of the cost
of the minimum state educational program in that parish." From
the language of this amendment the court discerns "a primary
9. 41 So.(2d) 509, 515 (La. 1949).
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purpose" on the part of its framers "to create and maintain a
definite fund in the treasury, dedicated to the support of public
common schools and distributable on the 3/-Y4 basis, sufficient
to defray no more than 90% of the cost of the minimum state
educational program in every parish of the state .. ."10 At the
same time it points out, however, that "the Legislature was not
required by the 1934 amendment to maintain a surplus (in excess
of $10,000,000.00) in the State Public School Fund to be apportioned on the 3/4th- 1/th basis; hence, it could regulate its appropriations and the proceeds of tax levies ... so as to restrict that
fund to the directed minimum."' 1
The 1947 amendment which cast the provision in its present
form, eliminated the 90% maximum disbursement provision of
the 1934 amendment to enable the legislature, as the court observed, "to disburse a surplus, which had accumulated in the State
Public School Fund, without regard to the cost of the minimum
state educational program." 12 It was this amendment which also
inserted the language, heavily relied upon by the plaintiff that
"all such funds [from the Public School Fund], including any
appropriation from the, general fund, shall be apportioned and
distributed [on the 3/4-1/4 formula basis]." Rejecting so literal an
interpretation of the amendment's provisions, however, and in
light of the section's history, the court concluded that it "did not
militate against the discussed primary purpose seemingly indicated by the provisions of the 1934 amendment" and adhered to
the view that the 3/4-4 formula was applicable only to the minimum sum of $10,000,000 required to be provided by the legislature. Since it had already appropriated in excess of $37,000,000
for each year of the biennium to be so distributed, the legislature
had fulfilled its obligation.
By having thus discovered ambiguity in what otherwise appeared to be an unequivocal provision, the court was enabled to
resort to an interpretation which saved rather than destroyed the
statute. At the same time, the defeat of the proposed amendment
became inconsequential as a reflection of the will of the people,
since the result was within the legislature's power without
amendment. Insofar as legislative doubts were reflected by the
mere proposal of the amendment, the court added, "These, undoubtedly, were in the nature of precautionary measures taken
10. Id. at 516.
11. Id. at 517.
12. Ibid.
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by reason of the ambiguity attending the constitutional pro13
visions under consideration.
Viewed in its practical aspects, the decision unquestionably
made possible the administration of the teachers minimum salary
act in a fashion which was desired by the great majority of all
persons concerned. A contrary decision in the case would have
brought about the very result that the people of the state through
their elected representatives had so obviously sought to prevent
by the enactment of the minimum salary act. A court, under
such circumstances, which is able to promote rather than obstruct the accomplishment of an objective sought by the great
majority of the people, demonstrates its acknowledgment of a
duty as one of three coordinate branches of government to serve
the needs of its citizens. This is not to say that legislative enactments, however popular, are not to be declared invalid in proper
cases. The presumption of validity must, of course, fall when
non-conformance with constitutional requirements is clearly demonstrated. But, as in the instant case, courts should be exceedingly cautious to make a conclusion of clear non-conformance without considering all other relevant factors in the case.
Due Process of Law
In its decisions in In re Bryant14 and State v. Ricks 5 the court
sustained the power of the legislature to make provision for the
taking of a person's liberty and property, respectively, without
giving the affected party any notice of the intended deprivation
or opportunity to be heard in opposition to the measures proposed.
In both cases the statutory enactments and the action of appropriate officials in pursuance thereof were attacked as denials of
due process of law guaranteed by both state and federal constitutional provisions.' Each case clearly demonstrates that the requirements of notice and hearing as elements of due process of
law are not absolute, but may properly be denied or qualified by
the legislature in the appropriate exercise of its police power
designed to protect the public health, safety or morals. In both
cases it is pointed out that the injured party did have an appropriate remedy available to him in the event his interests had been
illegally or erroneously infringed.
In the Bryant case the plaintiff sought the annulment of a
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid.
214 La. 573, 38 So.(2d) 245 (1948).
41 So.(2d) 232 (La. 1949).
La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. 14, § 1.
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judgment which had been enteredin the course of proceedings under the Mental Health Act of 1944,17 a comprehensive piece of
legislation providing for the discovery and treatment of mental
disorders. Sections 11, 12, 13 and 17 of that act make provision
for the commitment of mentally ill persons without notice and
hearing being afforded the interested party. Section 13, under
which the proceedings leading up to the judgment here involved
were had, expressly states that the district court, before whom
the proceedings are conducted "may or may not request the presence of the mental patient" before committing him when "upon
the application of any responsible person, accompained by a certificate from the coroner and one other qualified physician" the
judge shall be of the "opinion [that] the welfare of the individual
and the community is served best by his commitment."
When the proceedings leading up to the judgment involved
in the instant case were initiated, Bryant was in fact served with
a warrant on December 14, 1945, ordering him to be present at a
hearing on the coroner's application on December 20. As a matter of fact, however, the court proceeded to hear the application
along with a number of others on December 17, 1945, three days
prior to that designated in the notice, and entered a judgment
adjudging Bryant insane and ordering his commitment which was
effected on December 20, 1945. Some time later, apparently in
the month of January 1946,18 Bryant was discharged from the
hospital "as being 'without psychosis', meaning not insane,"' 9
and soon thereafter filed the present action to annul the judgment
of December 17, 1945, on the ground that having been entered in
a proceeding of which he had no notice and in which he had no
opportunity to be heard, it was without due process and hence a
nullity. His request was denied on two grounds, first, because
"commitment to an insane asylum under a statute such as Act
No. 303 of 1944 is merely a matter of police regulation, purposing
to protect both the patient and the general public;, it produces
none of the effects of a formal interdiction, ' 20 and, second, because opportunity for a full hearing and the appointment of a
commission by the provisions of Sections 14-16 of the act in all
cases involving summary commitment orders under Sections 1113 and 17 if he requests it.
17. La. Act 303 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 3938.1 et seq.].
18. The opinion states that the "date is not definitely shown by the record." 214 La. 573, 578, 38 So.(2d) 245, 247.
19. Ibid.
20. 214 La. 578, 584, 38 So.(2d) 247, 249.
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The nature of the competing interests is at once apparent in
this type of case-that of society to protect itself against the possible harm which might be inflicted by the mentally deranged
person without risking the delays attendant upon the giving of
notice and hearing, and that of the individual to protect himself
against deprivation of his liberty through being "railroaded" to
an institution upon trumped-up charges of mental derangement
without having notice of the proceedings and opportunity to present evidence of his sanity. 21 While there might be some doubt
whether the first ground advanced by the court, standing alone,
would sustain the act in question, the presence of the provision
entitling the party to a hearing at his own request seems unquestionably to satisfy the demands of due process of law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, namely, that it
be appropriate to the nature of the proceedings and the parties
involved and that they have an opportunity at some stage of
the proceedings before action against them shall become final and
22
binding to present evidence against the right asserted.
In State v. Ricks 23 the court had occasion to consider Act 231
of 1928 which simply provides:
"That all officers of the State of Louisiana are hereby
authorized and empowered, and it is made mandatory and
compulsory on their part, to confiscate and immediately destroy all gambling devices known as slot machines that may
come to their attention, or that they may find in operation."
The defendants had been convicted of the crime of gambling
as defined by Article 90 of the Louisiana Criminal Code. One of
them owned the slot machines involved and the other had permitted them to be used on his premises, the two men dividing the
money deposited therein. Following conviction the trial court
had entered an order directing the destruction of the machine
pursuant to the provisions of the statutes quoted above. On appeal, in addition to urging reversal of the conviction, defendants
also challenged the constitutionality of the act of 1928 on the
ground that it authorized summary confiscation and destruction
21. For a detailed treatment of the subject in both its medical as well as

legal aspects, see Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill
(1946) 24 Texas L. Rev. 307, 340; Weihofen, Commitment of Mental PatientsProposals to Eliminate some Unhappy Features of our Legal Procedure
(1941) 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 99; Comment (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 747 (1942).

22. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569
(1884); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Admr, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed.
624 (1941).
23. 41 So.(2d) 232 (La.1949).
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without notice or hearing thereby effecting a taking of property
without due process of law. As the court observed, "It is, of
course, obvious that appellants have had due process of law in
this case as the destruction of the machine was not ordered until
after a full hearing and determination of the Court that it was a
gambling device, '24 but nevertheless their constitutional objection
was considered and rejected. Citing the leading federal case of
Lawton v. Steele,25 and quoting from its own earlier decision in
State v. Jackson26 which arose under the state prohibition law, the
court approved the present statute as a proper exercise of the
police power to condemn such property "as has become a public
nuisance, or has an unlawful existence or is obnoxious to the public health, public morals or public safety, without compensation
and without judicial inquiry. ' 27 In response to the claim, frequently advanced in such cases, that the broad reach of the statute
would permit the destruction of slot machines not intended for
gambling, the court pointed out that in the first place, the type of
machine authorized to be destroyed was clearly defined in the act,
and, in the second place, that if any officer should destroy a nonoffending device, he would become civilly liable to the owner,
thus providing a remedy for the victim.
The principle upon which the case is founded seems too firmly embedded in our jurisprudence, state and national, to hope for
modification. And, indeed, in the instant case the defendants did
in fact have a hearing prior to being deprived of their property.
There seems to be no sound reason for requiring the conduct of
such a hearing in all such cases where the nature of the property
itself is not such as to pose an immediate and dangerous threat
to the public health, safety or morals. Cases involving the summary destruction of diseased food, 28 uninspected milk which may
be a disease carrier, 29 or buildings which constitute fire hazards
or otherwise threaten the safety of persons or property in the
immediate vicinity, certainly are to be regarded as public nuisances and their summary abatement should not await the delays
of notice and hearing. On the other hand, however, where the
property is harmless in and of itself, and summary seizure will
remove it from dangerous use which threatens the public interest,
24. 41 So.(2d) 232, 233.
25. 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894).

26. 152 La. 656, 94 So. 150 (1922).
27. 41 So.(2d) 232, 234 (La. 1949), quoting from State v. Jackson, 152 La.

656, 94 So. 150 (1922).
28. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101,
53 L.Ed. 195 (1908).
29. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 33 S.Ct. 610, 57 L.Ed. 971 (1913).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. X

there would seem to be no great harm done to anyone to compel
the seizing officer to hold the property in his custody until a hearing can be held to determine the ultimate disposition to be made
of it.
Miscellaneous
A group of three other cases touched only incidentally upon
constitutional provisions. In Nassar v. Board of Commissioners
for PontchartrainLevee District,30 the plaintiff, challenging the
validity of a bond issue which the board was preparing to offer
pursuant to authorization contained in a constitutional amendment,31 alleged "that all of the property within the district is
sought to be burdened with a debt that is being incurred for the
exclusive benefit of the improvements being located in the lower
portion of the district, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States .... ,,32
The court refused to
consider the claim saying "The plaintiff having neither alleged
nor shown in what respect he is being deprived of his property
without due process, these allegations constitute nothing more
than the conclusion of the pleader and need no further comment.' '33 Another issue which was raised in the case was whether
the plaintiff had filed his suit within the thirty-day period prescribed for such action by the provisions'of Article XVI, Section
8, of the state constitution. The suit was filed before the bonds had
been sold (possibly even before they had been printed, signed
and prepared for sale) but more than thirty days after the board
had adopted its resolution authorizing their issuance and sale.
On this point the court held that the suit was not barred by prescription, construing the constitutional provision ("within 30 days
of issuance of said bonds") to contemplate the printing and
signing of the bonds before the period begins to run. In Harrel
v. Winn ParishSchool Board3 4 a similar issue was likewise raised
by the plaintiff-taxpayer under other provisions of the constitution. There the defendant school board, by a resolution adopted
on May 2, 1947, enlarged its district with the result that the bonded indebtedness of the enlarged district exceeded "ten percentum
of the assessed valuation of the taxable property" situated therein contrary to the provisions of Article XIV, Section 14 (f) of
the constitution. Thereafter, on May 18, 1948, the taxpayers
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

214 La. 214, 36 So.(2d) 761 (1948).
La. Act 398 of 1946, amending La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 8.
214 La. 214, 218, 36 So.(2d) 761, 762.
Ibid.
214 La. 1095, 39 So.(2d) 743 (1949).

1950]

WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT

voted a bond issue to finance the affairs of the school district,
and the returns of that election were promulgated on May 22,
1948. On February 11, 1949, plaintiff filed his suit to restrain
the issuance of the bonds' for the reason indicated. His suit was
dismissed on the authority of Article XIV, Section 14 (o), which
permits such elections to be challenged within sixty days following the promulgation of results, but also provides that:
"If the 'Validity of any election, special tax or bond issue
authorized or provided for, held under the provisions of this
section, is not raised within the sixty (60) days herein prescribed, the authority to issue the bonds, the legality thereof
and of the taxes necessary to pay the same shall be conclusively presumed, and no court shall have authority to inquire
into such matters."
State ex rel. Kemp, Attorney General v. Board of Liquidation
of State Debt 35 was an injunction proceeding in which the attorney general sought to restrain the board and its individual
members from issuing and selling bonds, the proceeds of which
were to be used in paying bonuses to veterans of World War II
or their dependents under the terms of the constitutional amendment 36 proposed by Act 530 of 1948. Although the amendment providing for the issuance of the bonds simply authorized the board
to secure their payment from the proceeds of the tax on beer
which was levied by Act 8 of 1948, the board in issuing them
had provided that they should be general obligations of the state
secured by its full faith and credit. It was to this feature that
the attorney general directed his objection, contending that the
bonds should have been secured solely by the proceeds of the beer
tax. The court denied the injunction, and, after holding that by
virtue of Article IV, Section 1 (a), of the constitution the board
"is a department of state government and not [an] entity distinct
from the state .. .[and that] any indebtedness which the board
lawfully incurs is therefore the indebtedness of the state and not
the obligation of the board itself, '3 7 proceeded to declare on principles of statutory construction that, in the absence of any portion
in the act proposing the amendment which expressly limited the
security of the bonds to the proceeds of the beer tax, they were
properly made general obligations of the state. The conclusion
is amply supported by authorities which are cited by the court.
35. 214 La. 890, 39 So.(2d) 333 (1949).
36. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVIII, § 10.
37. 214 La. 890, 895, 39 So.(2d) 333, 334.
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In McCall v. Regan,38 the court had occasion to rely upon the
terms of constitutional provision to enable it to resolve a question
of statutory construction, choosing one interpretation in preference to another when it appeared that the rejected construction
would create a conflict between the constitution and the statute
resulting in the latter's invalidation. The suit was an election
contest involving the office of Judge of the Court of Appeal for
the Parish of Orleans. Plaintiff, having been declared the unsuccessful candidate, filed his suit against his opponent and others in
the District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, proceeding
upon the theory that the office for which election was sought
was that of a "State officer" within the meaning of Section 86 of
Act 46 of 1940, designating that court as the proper forum in such
cases. In support of his plea to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae, defendant urged that the office involved in the
contest was a "district office" within the meaning of the statute
in question, requiring that suit be filed in the "District Court of
the parish in which the contestee resides." In the course of the
opinion the court acknowledged that the issue was not wholly
free from doubt, but concluded that "when the act is read as a
whole, and particularly those provisions that are pertinent here,
it unmistakably shows that the office of judge of the Court of
Appeal for the Parish of Orleans is a district office, as distinguished from a state office within the meaning of the act. '3 9 Added
support for the conclusion was found in the language of Article
VIII, Section 12, of the state constitution which reads:
"The Legislature shall provide by law for the trial and
determination of contested elections of all public officers
whether state, district, judicial, parochial, municipal or ward
(except Governor and Lieutenant Governor) which trials
shall be by courts of law, and at the domicile of the party
defendant."
Under the language of this section, the statute if construed to
permit the trial of the action in any parish other than Orleans
(the domicile of the defendant) would obviously offend the constitution and be invalid. The case is, of course, properly decided,
but questions are raised concerning the validity of that portion
of the statute which apparently permits the trial of contested
elections involving the enumerated state offices ("Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State,
38. 214 La. 254, 36 So.(2d) 830 (1948).
39. 214 La. 254, 257, 36 So.(2d) 830, 831.
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State Treasurer, Auditor of Public Accounts, Superintendent of
Public Education [before] the Judge of the District Court of the
Parish in which the capitol of the State is situated" 40 ) in cases
where that parish is not the domicile of the defendant.
TAXATION

Charles A. Reynard*
Income Tax
. In W. Horace Williams Company, Incorporatedv.,Cocreham'
the court decided the fifth case that has come before it under the
provisions of the fifteen year old state income tax act.2 In 1931,
three years prior to the enactment of the statute, the plaintiff
had realized a capital gain in excess of $450,000 from the sale of
a portion of its property, accepting bonds secured by a mortgage
in payment on the sale. Under the circumstances the plaintiff
was permitted, and, in fact, did elect to avail itself of the optional
provisions of Section 44(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 8 to report the profit on the transaction on an installment sale basis for
federal income tax purposes. Beginning with 1936 and continuously thereafter until 1941 the plaintiff, in reporting its net income for state law purposes, took deductions for federal taxes,
pursuant to Section 9 of the state act, including the portions
thereof attributable to the profit on the installment sale. In 1941,
by apparent inadvertence, the deduction was not taken and
thereafter plaintiff filed a claim for a refund. To its very probable chagrin, the claim was not only denied, but led to a re-audit
of its prior returns and a determination of deficiency for those
earlier years on the theory that the item in question never was
properly deductible in computing net income. The collector's
action was based upon the ground that while Section 9 specifically authorizes the deduction of taxes in computing net income,
nevertheless, Section 10(a) (5), broadly limiting deductions in
general, rendered this item non deductible by providing that "no
deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of .. . any
amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to
40. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 86 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 2862.90].
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 214 La. 520, 38 So. (2d) 157 (1948).
2. La. Act 21 of 1934, as amended [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 8587.1 et
seq.]. The four previous cases are A. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co.
v. Collector of Revenue, 196 La. 591, 199 So. 652 (1941); Rathborne v. Collector of Revenue, 196 La. 795, 200 So. 149 (1941); Bentley's Estate v. Director
of Revenue, 199 La. 609, 6 So. (2d) 705 (1942); Standard Oil Co. of New

Jersey v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. (2d) 268 (1946).
3. 26 U.S.C.A. 44 (b).

